With a fantastic gun artillery system like the PzH 2000, one might wonder why we’d need anything else. Gun artillery is great at providing sustained striking power. To increase the destruction, you need more howitzers and more time, especially considering the cost of modern self-propelled howitzers. Sometimes you need a lot of destruction all at once. Sometimes, you catch the enemy with his guard down, and you really want to hit with a big haymaker and frontload your striking power all at once. For that, you want rocket artillery.

The first big users of (modern) rocket artillery were the Soviets, who used it to great effect against the Germans on the Eastern front. Rocket artillery hit really hard and was pretty cheap, since all you needed were rails on the back of a Studebaker truck. The rockets themselves were pretty simple too. Say what you like about the Russians, but they learn from their successes, and they continue to be a world leader in rocket artillery systems, with their flagship being the BM-30 Smerch. Being blatant copycats of the Russians, the Chinese are also big rocket artillery producers and they currently produce the biggest rocket artillery system available in the 400 mm WS-2. But we’re not talking about either of those systems. No, the best rocket artillery system is the American M270.

The M270 was designed in 1977, when the US Army remembered that the M4 Sherman Calliope rocket artillery was actually kinda helpful, and gee, if those Soviets had so many stupid rocket artillery systems, maybe we should get some too. It’s built on a Bradley chassis that’s been so heavily modified as to be almost unrecognizable. It’s more like the bastard spawn of a Bradley and a flatbed truck. The M270 has a crew of 3, a 500 hp diesel engine, and an operational range of 640 km. It carries twelve 227mm rockets, and can launch them all in under 40 seconds.

Big rockets like the 227mm units on the M270 are designed with cluster munitions in mind. The standard loadout is 644 Dual Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions (DPICM) per rocket. These are basically shaped charge submunitions with a fragmentation shell. The basic rocket has a range of 32 km. Variant rocket types are available with improved range at the cost of fewer submunitions (518 DPICMs and a range of 45 km). Other options include GPS guidance, a big unitary warhead variant, and a variant equipped with the high-end guided SADARM (Sense and Destroy ARMor) submuntion.

SADARM can be fired from rockets or 155mm artillery shells. It works by using a system of parachutes to slow its fall while it scans the area below it with both millimeter wave radar and an infrared optical system. If it detects an armored vehicle, it can be steered toward the target by altering its rate of spin. Once over the target vehicle, it deploys an explosively formed penetrator. It’s pretty lethal, sort of a “quality” alternative to the “quantity” attack option of DPICM.

The big DPICM attack option is pretty formidable. In the first Persian Gulf War, the British found that a single M270 could basically kill everything in a 1 km by 1 km grid square on a general’s map. This is pretty cool, but none of this is really unique to the M270. For those that are cool with cluster munitions still (yes, this includes Russia and China, and Borgundy too), the Russians and Chinese offer rockets of equal size or larger that can carry all kinds of submunition payloads. Satellite guidance is also something they can do, as is fancy guided antitank submuntions.

It should be noted that the big 300mm rockets of the BM-30 and the 400mm rockets of the WS-2 can both carry more submunitions, since they’re bigger. The big advantage of the M270 is that it can also launch the MGM-140 ATACMS short range ballistic missile. It can carry a pair of these instead of the dozen 227 mm rockets. Again, ATACMS can be equipped with submunitions or a unitary warhead, and GPS guidance is available. Not that we’ve tried, but you could put a small nuclear warhead¹ in without too much trouble. Range is basically constrained only by the pesky MTCR. So the M270 provides both a standard rocket artillery capability and an SRBM capability in the same vehicle. It’s more or less equivalent to both the Russian BM-27 and Iskander systems, if you could combine those.

Production of the M270 ended in 2003. If there was one unit I’d like to restart the production lines for, it’d be the M270. Maybe we can make a deal, Fishbreath?

1.) The W84 seems like a good choice for a “physics package.” If you wanted destabilizing, anyway.

To work out our short to medium range air defense system, it’ll help to see how it plugs in to the rest of our integrated air defense network. We’ll bracket the problem by working out our man-portable system first, then our long range system, and then we’ll fit our challenge answering system in between.

For man portable air defense systems (MANPADS), there are two schools of thought. One is typified by the famous FIM-92 Stinger, and relies on some type of infrared seeker for guidance. This one is much more common. The other system, typified by the RBS-70, uses a semi-active laser homing guidance method.

On the one hand, the Stinger is easy to use. Acquire target, get tone, shoot. The operator does not need much training, and the missile is fire and forget. Plus, there are no emissions (like radar or lasers) to give the missile launch away. On the other hand, IR guidance is commonly used in short range missiles, so infrared countermeasures are common. A large part of the success or failure of Stinger-type missiles depend on the relative strength of the seeker design and the countermeasure systems on the opposing aircraft. The RBS-70 is not fire-and-forget, and requires a trained and keen operator. The laser-homing seeker is much harder for an aircraft to spoof, and is generally considered only counterable kinematically. This is a problem for all MANPADS; they must be small to be able to be carried by the infantry, so they don’t have much room for launch motors. That said, not having any kind of big obvious radar makes them much harder to suppress. Kinematically, the most formidable missile in this size class is the British Starstreak, which has a nice range advantage over its competitors and achieves the astonishing speed of Mach 3.5. Starstreak uses a SALH seeker, and an interesting warhead that requires a hit to work (i.e. it has no proximity fuze). Given the missile’s speed and the size of other missiles’ warheads, this is probably not much of a disadvantage. Starstreak uses the nigh impossible to decoy SACLOS guidance system, which is training-intensive. However, even for this most modern of the SACLOS system, manufacturer claimed hit probabilities are significantly lower than those of contemporary IR guided weapons. This might have been somewhat rectified by the auto-tracking system that the British had planned to develop for Starstreak, but this has been cancelled.

Looking at IR guided missiles, the seeker is key. Range, performance against countermeasures, and P_k all depend on the seeker. Of the IR guided missiles, most modern ones have a two-color seeker. A focal plane array seeker would be better, but none are currently available, so range is more or less equivalent, as is countermeasure resistance. Some variation in counter-countermeasure capability can be expected based on software updates, but these don’t really put one model ahead of the rest. Interestingly, the French Mistral 2 sacrifices weight for kinematics, and is capable of an astonishing Mach 2.5. It’s not as good as Starstreak, but it’s far ahead of the competition. That said, it’s very heavy, and can only be fired from a tripod platform or from a vehicle mount. Ready to go, Mistral 2 in launcher weighs about 40 kilos or so, more than twice that of Stinger. We’ll take the mass produced, lighter, cheaper Stinger. We nominally deploy a platoon of MANPADS per battalion.

How does Stinger stack up to the Russian systems that Fishbreath hasn’t allowed me to buy? Pretty well. Stinger is pretty similar to Igla-S, with a bit of a larger warhead and slightly better range. Newer Russian systems (the Verba) come with a three-color IR seeker, as opposed to the two-color of Stinger, so that’s a seeker advantage to the Russians. Verba should be better at distinguishing between real targets and decoys. Overall, the missiles are quite comparable. Stinger also has the very neat M1097 platform, which I’ll get to later.

MANPADS only gets us so far though. It’s mostly an ambush sort of weapon. It’s great for pegging helicopters or low flying aircraft, but it’s not that hard to switch to a medium-altitude attack profile and avoid the pesky little missiles entirely. So we’ll clearly need something bigger, which brings us, as promised, to our long-range air defense system.

The western standard long-range surface to air weapon system is the MIM-104 Patriot. It’s got a PESA radar, was the first in the world to network effectively with other air defense components as well as AWACS, and has been proven in combat. It has some notable shortcomings, including not providing all-around radar coverage and using towed components rather than self-propelled ones. There’s also the issue with the latest missile, the PAC-3, having relatively limited range. This missile problem also plagues the MEADS system, which uses the same PAC-3 round. MEADS does have much better radars than Patriot, and uses solely self-propelled vehicles. However, it’s not actually ready yet; while it is on offer, the buyer would have to toss money at it to finish development, which has left it out of the running in several recent contests. In general, Borgundy doesn’t like to be the first to adopt something, so MEADS is out. Plus, waiting sucks.

The other alternative is SAMP/T, a land based Aster system. While its radar provides all-around coverage, it lacks the range and power of the Patriot’s radar, being based on the smallest and least-capable naval Aster-compatible radar system. Patriot brings many more available missile types, having an ABM-ready missile in the PAC-3 and an anti-ECM aircraft missile in addition to the regular SAM. The Patriot missiles have longer range and slightly more speed (Mach 5 v. 4.5), but use track-via-missile guidance, as opposed to the Aster’s active radar homing seeker. Track via missile is cheaper (for missile components) than active radar homing, and doesn’t give the distinctive warning of an active-radar seeker, but is dependent on that main radar, so it’s vulnerable to ARM attacks as well as escaping the envelope or breaking line of sight. All that said, we still think the Patriot is the better buy. It’s proven interoperability is a big edge, and we can expect future upgrades, since the US has opted to keep upgrading Patriots rather than go with MEADS. We’d really like to see MEADS radars and some of the fancy plug-and-fight capability of MEADS make it’s way over to the Patriot system.

How does Patriot compare to Russian systems? Well, the latest Russian system, the S-400 (which is a lot more expensive than Patriot, strangely enough), has a really long range missile, and Patriot lacks anything in the same range class. However, such a missile has serious radar horizon issues, and I wonder what targets it’s designed to engage at 400 km. Probably AWACS or incoming ballistic missiles, since anything else would be able to make a turn or something and make the missile miss. Otherwise, the systems compare quite favorably. The regular SAMs on the Russian systems are pretty comparable to those of Patriot as far as kinematics goes. Sensorwise, the Russians have a bunch of cool options like a radar-on-a-pedestal to help provide locks on low-flying targets. On the other hand, Patriot has a much better networking system, specifically when it comes to networking with other things that aren’t SAM systems. Just like the US Navy’s Aegis SAM system, Patriot can network with the F-35 Lightning II for targeting data to cue and guide the missiles. S-400 can also network with other systems, but not as well as Patriot. It certainly can’t use a Su-35 for targeting data directly. The S-300 systems can really only network with other missile systems, and they don’t do this very well.

Now let’s examine the medium-range problem presented by Fishbreath. We need to fit something in between the Stinger and the Patriot. We’d like it to be able to network with the Patriot system as well as other air defense assets, and we’d like it to be reasonably mobile. And, the western SAM market being what it is presently, there aren’t that many options. Roland and Rapier are out of production, and both are rather archaic. Rapier also fails to meet mobility requirements. It may also help to consider how the system will be deployed. As we’ve said, MANPADS are generally deployed at the battalion level. The Patriot system is quite elaborate, and as such it’s not going to be the best choice for covering a fast moving armored assault. We would expect Patriot missiles to be deployed at the Corps level if at all in an operational theater. Like most longer range systems, they’re much better suited to protecting big zones and large fixed targets. There are a couple upcoming SAM systems that look promising: CAMM and LFK NG. Both of these seem like formidable options, but aren’t available yet. We could wait. We could also make do with some older systems, like buying used Rolands or trying to get France to keep the Crotale lines open. But we won’t, because (a) that’s rather poor cricket, as Fishbreath would say, and (b) there’s an obvious system that meets all of our needs and then some: NASAMS II.

NASAMS II was originally developed for Norway’s air defense needs. It was originally designed to fire the AIM-120 AMRAAM, but launchable missiles have been extended to include AIM-9, IRIS-T and a RIM-162 ESSM variant with the AMRAAM’s active seeker. The system is designed to have high network interoperability and pull data for targeting from other platforms. It can also use it’s own radar, which is usually either an AN/TPQ-36 or an AN/TPQ-64. The -64 is the radar used with the latest variant of the venerable Hawk SAM system, so these are pretty common and not all that expensive. Alternatively, since the missiles all have either active radar seekers or IR homing seekers, the launchers can fire off of external references only, which is perfect if they’re on the move and caught with the radar out of position. The launcher is a rather simple affair that can be mounted on the back of a truck. An alternative rail-type launcher can be mounted on the back of a HMMWV. Plus, we were already going to buy AMRAAMs, ESSMs, and either AIM-9s or IRIS-Ts, so we don’t need to stock another missile. Being a rather simple system, we expect costs to be low, for once.

Compared to Crotale, we can get better guidance options with either IR or active radar seeker in NASAMS II. Crotale uses radio command guidance, which also requires either IRST cueing on the launcher or radar cueing from the launcher. Radar cueing can be particularly dangerous for short range systems, since they’re quite overmatched in range by anti-radar missiles. Compared to the nearest Russian equivalents, the launch system is going to be cheaper than the SA-15, but that’s not strictly a fair comparison, since NASAMS doesn’t have a radar of its own and Tor does. As a battery with radar(s) command vehicle and several launchers, NASAMS II is pretty similar to Buk. The missiles are somewhat less well performing, but cheaper. It networks much better though, and the launchers can be used independently. We’re trading raw power for economics and trickiness.

Okay, let’s review. We have Stinger missiles as our man portable air defense system. We can also use the M1097 Avenger system to gain some network capability on the short range end. This system holds eight Stingers on a rotating turret on the back of a HMMWV, and has a network datalink for missile cueing. We have NASAMS II launchers that can be fitted on the back of medium trucks (or more HMMWVs), and those can cue off of networked radars or their own radar system, and we figure that each division would have a good number of these to use and allocate to brigades as they advance. Finally, we have the big Patriot missiles for area and corps-level defense. We can network in AWACS assets, and even our fighters.

But wait, there’s more. Since the Borgundian War Department is somewhat paranoid (it’s in their job description), and they reckon that the Sov–I mean, the Russians might decide that perhaps, just once, they might try this launching this new ‘surprise attack’ thing themselves rather than getting suckerpunched. So it would be really cool if we could have a big radar to provide some level of early warning. Fortunately, Raytheon is happy to deliver. The AN/FPS-132 BMEWS has a trio of AESA arrays that are a massive 25.6 meters in diameter. It provides all around coverage at extremely long ranges, albeit at rather low resolution. Still, it’s a nice addition to the network.

Any network this fancy needs a name. Something cooler than just Borgundy backwards (like Iraq’s system). Since a cornerstone is the Patriot, and most of the components are made by Raytheon (headquartered in Andover, Mass), and since I know he’s Fishbreath’s favorite football coach, we’ll call our system BELICHICK. Air defense control personnel will be issued the SB15 sweatshirt, hooded, grey.

Here’s a change of pace from our regular procurement game. Let’s go back to a time before precision guidance was all the rage. A time when Saigon was still Saigon (albeit about to fall). A time when a favorite marching cadence was ‘Napalm Sticks to Kids’. A time when the Soviet Union was extant and terrifying and, yes, a time when Gerald Ford was in the white house. Welcome to the mid-1970s. Borgundy is still a reasonably well off European nation, a proud NATO member squaring off against the Warsaw Pact. We’d like a big new frontline fighter for the defense of our realm, and the best and latest in advanced western types are both American: the Grumman F-14A and the McDonnell Douglas F-15A. Let’s compare them, and see which comes away with the win. Remember, it’s 1975, so we can’t let any knowledge of how these two planes shook out affect our choice.

We’ll start with the Grumman offering, since it’s newer. The Grumman F-14 can be thought of as the ultimate fleet defense fighter. It’s built more or less to the same concept that gave birth to the fabulously successful F-4 Phantom II, but supersized, and uses the latest aerodynamics technology. It’s designed to have a long operating range and endurance, so it can fly a good distance out from the carrier, from where it will engage Soviet bombers before they can launch their missiles. To that end, it has plenty of fuel storage, high-tech swing wings for good speed and short-field performance, the most powerful fighter radar in the world (the AWG-9), and the longest range air to air missile in the world (the AIM-54 Phoenix). The Phoenix even has a fancy active seeker, unlike those lame semi-active seekers on the USAF standard Sparrow missile. Like the Phantom, the Tomcat has a two-man crew, one pilot, and one to operate the advanced radar system. It has the same TF30 turbofans as the F-111, however. Peformancewise, the F-14 was designed to match the Phantom as far as speed and maneuverability goes, but have a main armament that’s much longer ranged. And unlike the F-4, it does have a gun–the US Navy learned its lessons from Vietnam.

The McDonnell Douglas F-15 is designed to be the ultimate air superiority fighter, something the US Air Force hasn’t had in years. It is designed to be able to beat any current or projected future fighter type in air to air combat. The US Air Force took the Vietnam lessons to heart too. The Eagle is faster than the F-4, and is second only to the MiG-25 in top speed. It’s more agile overall than the F-4 or the F-14 because of it’s superior thrust to weight ratio and structural tolerance for more Gs. Like the F-14, it has a 20mm M61 Vulcan cannon with plenty of ammunition for a shootout or a strafing run. It does not carry the Phoenix missile, instead it carries Sidewinders and Sparrows, just like the Phantom. Unlike the Phantom and the Tomcat, the Eagle is a single seat fighter. It’s radar, while more advanced than the APQ-72 on the Phantom, is less powerful than the AWG-9 of the F-14. However, automation allows a single pilot to use it effectively. The F-15 was designed with offensive counter-air sweeps in mind, just like USAF F-4s flew in Vietnam.

So how do these two compare? Contractwise at about this time, they’re dead even. The Shah of Iran chose the F-14, the Israelis chose the F-15. Which will we choose? Well, the F-14 has the better sensor suite by far, with the AWG-9 being able to track 24 targets simultaneously, and attack up to six with Phoenix missiles. It even has look-down/shoot-down capability. The Tomcat also has an infrared search and track system mounted under the nose to help with target identification. While the F-15 also has a look-down/shoot-down capable radar in the APG-63, it has less range, simultaneous tracking capability, and simultaneous engagement capability. What it does have are a number of semiautomatic modes that make it very easy for a single crewman to employ in combat. The F-14 was designed to operate (more or less) on it’s own on extended patrols protecting a carrier battle group, or covering a Vietnam-style strike package from Yankee Station. The F-15 was designed with the significant USAF support assets of AWACS and jamming aircraft in sweeps to support strike packages, again, as in Vietnam. It also has a superior IFF system. Recent experience in the air war over Vietnam has demonstrated that beyond visual range methods are not as guaranteed as the missile manufacturers claim. The long-range AIM-54 was designed to kill bombers, and we are somewhat skeptical of its ability to effectively kill agile enemy fighters at range.

Vietnam demonstrated that air combat maneuvering capability is important, and the F-15 excels here. Part of this is because it’s a lighter, smaller plane. It carries less fuel. It’s structure is also rated to handle more G-force than that of the F-14. The F-15 also has far superior engines. In order to cut costs, the US Navy tried to re-use as much as it could from the colossal failure that was the F-111B, and that included the engines. However, not only does this give the F-14A a rather anemic thrust-to-weight ratio, but the TF30 is also very prone to compressor stalls at high angles of attack. It was never designed for a platform that would maneuver aggressively. And because the Tomcat’s engine nacelles are widely spaced, in order to provide room ot carry the big AIM-54 missiles, a compressor stall in one engine can lead to a flat spin, which is very difficult to recover from.¹

The Eagle is the cheaper fighter to procure, but the numbers I found may be colored by its larger production run. It isn’t that much cheaper though; they’re certainly in the same price class (like a Porsche and a Lamborghini). The F-15 is significantly cheaper to operate and maintain. It has a number of design elements that simplify maintenance, and it doesn’t have the complicated variable geometry wings.² This translates into increased availability for sorties, and (of course) more sorties for the money.

Famously, the F-15’s unofficial design motto was “Not a pound for air to ground”, though this is probably apocryphal. As seen by the minor changes needed for the F-15E, McDonnell Douglas certainly put in enough structural strength for ground attack missions. The Tomcat is also capable of carrying plenty of bombs, though neither the USN nor the USAF has bothered to integrate any air to ground weapons into the stores management system. So that’s a wash. As far as air to air armament goes, the biggest difference is the massive (but also very expensive) AIM-54 on the Tomcat. In terms of number of missiles, both planes field eight air to air missiles. In the ‘small advantages’ column, the F-15 carries more ammunition for its 20mm cannon, with 940 rounds to the F-14’s 675.

So, what is the final decision? We’re going for the Eagle. Better air combat capabilities against fighters and lower operating costs put the F-15 ahead of the F-14 for us. The offensive counter air mission is a much bigger need than a long range interceptor. And if the Soviets come at us hard, it will probably be by land, and we’ll want to neutralize their frontline aviation while bombing the living daylights out of their second echelon, reserves, and logistics. We’ll actually need another plane for the mud-moving; the Eagle is expensive enough without us trying to make it into a ground attack aircraft on our own.

1.) See Top Gun for a hands-on demonstration of a nasty flat spin. At least it’s not inverted. Or you could, but this is 1975, and it hasn’t been made yet.
2.) Stepping out of 1975 for a moment, we can see this reflected in that the USAF still operates F-15s, but the USN phased the F-14 out of service in 2006. But we have no way of knowing that in 1975 of course. 2006 is a long way off in the future; people probably commute in flying cars or something weird like that.

While Borgundy agrees with the Russian view that the best weapon to combat a tank is another tank, and combined arms with plenty of tank-infantry cooperation are the keys to success, this does not mean that the infantry should not have weapons for killing tanks. It’s all the more important since most modern western IFVs don’t mount anti-tank missiles. While Fishbreath’s challenge isn’t strictly accurate structure-wise for mechanized infantry, the general point holds. We’ll need two weapons: a man portable anti-tank guided missile (henceforth ATGM), and something unguided that can defeat tanks up close with the secondary purpose of battlefield demolition. We can’t really do away with the rocket launcher requirement, because the rounds are cheap and useful for blowing up bunkers and the like, plus if a tank gets in close, they don’t require any guidance preparation. Guidance is clearly required for longer-range shots.

We’ll start with the relatively simple unguided case. With a general trend towards western suppliers, and the unfortunate demise of much of the French arms industry, our choices are rather limited. We first must answer a simple question: how much tank should we be able to kill with a rocket? Requiring penetration of heavy front armor, with likely ERA kits will drive up the weight (also the cost, but not by much–these are unguided weapons after all). The Panzerfaust 3T is probably the most powerful available rocket, should be reasonably capable of dealing with most modern frontal armor, even if ERA equipped, and comes with a computerized sight to aid in making long range shots. However, it weighs 33.5 lbs (15.2 kg). If we accept side penetration only, we have choices. The standard one-use only rocket is the Saab AT4, which weighs 14.8 lbs. Alternatively, for a somewhat heavier (20 lbs or so) reusable weapon, we could go with the Carl Gustav with it’s wide variety of available rounds. That said, we do really want the properly tank-killing potential of the Panzerfaust 3T. Since our army is heavily mechanized, we have an infantry fighting vehicle to help carry the load most of the time. We also have the IFVs gun, which provides a useful volume of high explosive support. However, the 35mm Bushmaster III chain gun on our IFVs isn’t really capable of killing tanks from the front, but it is reasonably capable of engaging them from the side. The Panzerfaust 3T at least adds an additional capability to the squad. Plus, there are large stocks of T-72 and T-80 tanks that could be pressed into service that can shrug off frontal hits from either AT4s or Charlie Gustav rounds.

On to the guided weapons. This is a little harder, because there are lots of similar systems available. First, taking stock of the threat, we should look at enemy armor. Again, we see the same problem as before of getting stuck in the race between armor and shaped charge warheads, made worse by the range requirements. For this reason, some modern missiles have attempted to get around the problem by attacking the top armor, which is thinner. The Milan missile doesn’t use top attack at all, but it’s basically obsolescent. Other missiles have better range, tank-killing power, and fire-and-forget options. The heavy hitters in the competition are the Israeli Spike and the American Javelin, both of which have better guidance and bigger warheads than the Swedish BILL 2, which uses an overflight top-attack rather than a diving top attack flight profile. Javelin and Spike are similar missiles at similar price points, but the Spike has a longer-range man-portable version, and it has the option to keep the gunner in the loop with a fiber optic cable. Javelin can only do a fire and forget launch mode, but it has a better seeker, and both the Javelin missile itself and it’s reusable command launch unit are lighter. Cost is roughly comparable. We’ll take lighter and more effective within the range that ATGM shots are likely to be taken, so we’ll take the Javelin.

So, that should settle the challenge. That said, given our heavy and heavier options above and recent experiences in Iraq, there’s a need for a light rocket for demolition work, especially in urban settings and for bunker busting. It is also a useful squad capability, as it can be used to maximize shock effects in the initial moments of contact. For these uses, we want something light and cheap. Issues of carrying capacity can be handily resolved by our IFV, because it can carry what isn’t needed. This can be considered a bit of an “arms room” for the squad, provided we don’t go too overboard. For weapon choice, we can actually go even lighter than the AT4 with the older, Vietnam-era M72A7 LAW. It’s rated for about a third of the armor penetration of the Panzerfaust 3, but it only weighs five and a half pounds. It’s a perfectly adequate demolition rocket, and the light weight means it’s easy to add to the squad’s loadout even when there are no tanks around. It’s not a fancy warhead, but it’s cheap, light, and cheerful, and compliments the big panzerfaust 3 well. Plus, lest you think I’m cheating by buying more types of weapons than originally called for, the US army still buys old M72A7 LAWs plus the newer, more formidable AT4s, and Javelin missiles. And the Germans supplement their Panzerfaust 3 with Matador rockets.

When considering the APC, we must consider what we want it to do. We already have IFVs to do the front line combat. We have trucks that can transport lots of stuff or men relatively easily and cheaply. We need something in between. Something to handle supportive combat roles that can take fragments and bomblets better than a truck, but needn’t be hardened against serious gunfire. Something to haul mortars, escort convoys, transport wounded, shuttle soldiers, do light and medium vehicle recovery, and basically do a whole bunch of odd jobs.

The obvious choice would be the M113A3, but this vehicle is quite old and not in production any longer. It’s still almost certainly available on the used market, but it’s somewhat protection limited due to the old powertrain and suspension, and we certainly couldn’t rely on procuring the numbers and spares we want from the secondary market. Plus, it’s almost certainly a violation of the spirit of the rules, and makes for a rather boring post. We certainly won’t be giving up the M113s we have, but onward we go to find something more modern.

We can restrict ourselves to requiring a heavy machine gun in a remote weapon station for self defense and no more. An automatic grenade launcher might be a useful alternative, but the heavy machine gun is, in general, more versatile. In any case, either would fit in a weapon station of that size class. Any larger weapon would have a significantly greater footprint in the vehicle, which would compromise its primary transport duties. We’d either have a 20/25mm “giant machine gun” that would need a ton of ammo or a 30/35mm cannon that would require a coax gun and a second ammo supply. So we’ll stick with the one heavy machine gun for self-defense. Mortar carriers will, self-evidently, carry a mortar. This will probably be 120mm, which is a good standard size, and there’s not much reason to go smaller when you have a nice vehicle to haul the mortar and its ammunition around.

Let’s now come to the “Armored” portion of the vehicle. This is what’s separating it from a big truck carrying stuff around. The current modern standard seems to be protection from heavy machine gun fire all-around, and this seems reasonable considering the sorts of threats that it’s likely to face as a second-line unit. In general, mine protection has also been widely increased as part of the lessons learned in the Iraq campaign. While this is less relevant to those of us planning a conventional warfare first approach, our vehicles might encounter hastily laid mines as well in an effort to disrupt rear areas. Plus, with modern vehicles, there isn’t really an alternative. Increasing use of wheeled vehicles as IFVs has led to a plethora of turreted versions, which we’ll skip, and heavier front armor, which we don’t have much of an option on either.

The two biggest contenders here are the Boxer MRAV and the Patria AMV. The Boxer MRAV is rather more modular, since you can actually swap rear mission modules with a crane. It’s also somewhat better protected than the Patria, and more expensive. The Patria has won significant successes in the export market, and comes with more variants already fielded. MRAV comes out of the box with all of the fancy battle management computers that the cool kids like. It’s the extra systems integration and the basically future mission proof design of the Boxer that lets it win out here. With modules that can be swapped out in a couple of hours, the life of the Boxer can be extended with hull refurbishments and new modules containing new stuff. Even though it’s more expensive than the Patria AMV, it’s still cheaper than the VBCI and the Stryker.

I always liked the Sweet Science.

Richard Bong’s Ghost, I appear to have left out the F-35A from my procurement discussions. How could I have?

To be honest, I came into this not liking the Lightning II at all. It’s heavy, ugly, has relatively poor handling characteristics on paper, and is riding a massive hype machine. Oh, and it’s really, really expensive. It’s just not what I would have considered. But, I can’t have a discussion of modern fighter procurement without at least touching on it. And that means admitting that the F-35A is about as desirable as an independently-wealthy supermodel in a dating show. Which is to say, unfathomably desirable. I have great respect for the Israeli air force, and they’re on The List. I also respect the South Korean Air Force, which is also in a threatening location, and they cheated on the requirements (no really, they rewrote the requirements) just so they could get a piece of that Joint Strike Action. Neither of these air forces were part of the original partnership group, so they’re not trying to preserve local jobs. And despite the sticker price, Singapore calls it ‘economical.’ So, what am I missing? Well, a classified-level briefing and some fancy mathematical models of air combat, certainly. But beyond that, it’s probably important to figure out why the F-35A is so desirable to the world’s air forces. So let’s take a closer look at the Pride of Fair Columbia.

The F-35A is stealthy, and it’s in production now. Where else can you get both of those? Go ahead, look around, make a few calls. I’ll wait.
Yeah, that’s what I thought. Right there is something that you can get nowhere else without violating our rules. Stealth is cool. Is it as stealthy as a B-2A Spirit? No, but the Lightning II isn’t a big heavy bomber either. Its stealth is X-band optimized, and with internal weapons carriage its radar signature can’t be beat in its class, unless you want to look at prototypes or things that the US Congress says You Can’t Have. And unlike some people, I’ll hold myself to those rules. If you want stealth this is the only game in town. And you know the stealth is going to work, because Lockheed Martin has plenty of experience with those materials and that design. Which reminds me, just in case you’re not sold on this whole ‘stealth’ thing, go blow the dust off your VCR and put in your CNN Archive tapes from Gulf War I. Pretty cool. Operating with impunity over the heart of one of the premier air defense systems at the time. Stealth is a massive gain for survivability in the face of modern, integrated air defense systems.

I know what you’re thinking though. First, you’re going to gripe about the F-117A shot down over Serbia. And yeah, okay, you got me. Stealth isn’t perfect, and I never claimed that it was. This is not a cloaking device. It just makes it a lot harder to detect on radar. And in Serbia we’re talking about a really clever piece of surface to air missile operation, plus somewhat sloppy route planning package on an aircraft that had no systems to warn it of an incoming missile. Credit where it’s due, that was a hell of a shot. But it’s not really an indictment of stealth technology as worthless. We still have a phenomenal sortie:loss ratio here. The next obvious gripe is that the F-35A can only carry two JDAMs internally (with two AMRAAMs, or six AMRAAMs without the bombs). And it’s true, that’s not the greatest loadout ever. But we need to be precise–that’s the sneaky loadout. Two 2,000-lbs-class precision guided munitions is exactly what the F-117A carried. It can carry more in low-threat environments, when we’re less worried about our radar signature. But, unlike an F-16 (say), the F-35 can also sneak in and blow stuff up like an F-117. Which was pretty freaking useful despite its smallish loadout. And the Lightning II has really good range performance with only internal stores too.

But there’s more to the F-35 than just the stealth option. Even if we load up all of the external stores, we still have all of the electrics. And the electrics and sensors on the F-35 are second to none. On the front aspect, the F-35’s IRST is basically a built-in Sniper XR targeting pod, and that model is top of the line. So it’s got all of those features without needing to blow a hardpoint on a TGP. That’s not all though. There are six IR sensors around the airframe, arranged for all-around, always-on coverage. You read that right. Always-on. The computers integrate all this for the pilot to identify and track things all around him. When he turns his head, he sees what the appropriate sensor sees, right in his helmet, but the rest of the sensors are still feeding the computer data. No sensor panning. With the computer’s sensor fusion, this gives him the best situational awareness anywhere. Infrared and radar data is combined for identification and tracking purposes. The distributed IR system gives not only awesome infrared searching and tracking, but also missile approach warning, all in one system. But that’s not all. The F-35A has one of the top radars in the world, the AN/APG-81. It may not have the raw power of the IRBIS-E, but it’s cleverer, with fancy LPI modes and built-in electronic warfare capabilities. It’s got everything you’d want for reconnaissance too, with multiple ground moving target detection and tracking, high resolution mapping, and combat identification modes. But wait, it gets better. The F-35A has an integrated electronic warfare suite. It can provide all the SAM radar ranging data and jamming support that it might need, no bulky pods or separate EW aircraft needed. The F-35A has a datalink as well. While it’s not the first fighter to have one (cf. Fishbreath’s post on the Gripen), it has a particularly good one with some compelling features. Specifically, it can datalink to things that aren’t aircraft, such as long range surface to air missiles in order to provide guidance data. It’s like having an extra wingman when you’re fighting near friendly ground forces. Call it a home-field advantage.

Okay, so the F-35 has a lot of really compelling features that you can’t get in any other fighter. Awesome. But what about handling? Well, it gets some help from the internal stores. Anything inside clearly creates no drag. According to many sources, the F-35A with internal stores handles about like an F-16 with a similar weapons load. Now, there are a whole bunch of caveats here, but since I’m not about to try to make a fancy 3D comparative graph of performance data on these two planes, so I’ll take them at their word of “Roughly F-16-grade handling”, and it ought to be good enough for the purposes of this argument. Is ‘Roughly F-16-grade handling” enough? While the F-16’s handling is pretty darn good, the Rafale’s is better, as is that of the Sukhoi Su-35S, the most likely near-term opponent (anything more advanced isn’t in production yet, so it’s a lot harder to predict what the production version will be capable of). So what does that better handling get you? To know this, it helps to know why we bothered going for handling in the first place. At the start of the “Fourth Generation” of jet fighter design, a missile could reliably engage a bogey regardless of its aspect. But the missile had a limited envelope, which is to say the zone in which it could see a target to engage it. Call this envelope a roughly 60-degree cone with the apex at the nose of the launching fighter. Better maneuverability meant that you could get your cone on the other guy first, and so you got first shot. Does this ensure a kill? No, because P_K is never one. But it helps, because it usually gets the other guy to go defensive, which meant he had something better to do than try to kill you. Getting first shot is always better. Now, the F-35’s designers say that given the fancy sensor fusion and all-aspect sensors, as well as missiles that can engage a target on any relative bearing, we don’t really need all that agility. You’ve got first shot if you can see him and if he’s close enough. You also get the stealth on your side, to reduce your radar signature, and thus the range at which the other guy can lock you up and get his shot off. All points in the Lightning II’s favor. And there’s the aforementioned integrated electronic warfare, to make an opponent’s life worse.

But what if we’re wrong? What if the Pentagon and Lockheed got their vision of the future wrong? Well, we’d still have all the nifty strike and EW support aspects that I mentioned previously. As for the dogfights, let’s look at some history. The F-4 Phantom II is, on paper, rather a poor dogfighter. It’s big and doesn’t have the handling of it’s Russian contemporaries. In Viet Nam, we saw that it’s vaunted AIM-7 Sparrow missiles weren’t very good at their jobs. And, since the USAF and USN didn’t train pilots in dogfighting, they weren’t very good at it. So the Americans got their butts handed to them by the Vietnamese. But then, the Americans decided that something had to change. So the TOPGUN program and the Red Flag exercises were created, to train pilots in dogfighting. Even dogfighting with opponents who flew different planes, with different strengths and weaknesses than a pilot’s own. And the pilot training emphasis meant that afterwards the Americans gained a favorable kill ratio against their Vietnamese opponents. Similar results happened in the Arab-Israeli wars, where superior training on the part of the Israeli Air Force made up for any shortcomings in their fighters. Looking even further back, General Chennault’s Flying Tigers had an impressive kill:loss ratio against Japanese pilots in China, despite flying aircraft that looked terribly inferior on paper. So, if we do our part with a good training program, we can make up for any shortcomings that a fighter might have. But to be fair, we don’t know these shortcomings yet.

With all that said, the advantages of the Lightning II outweigh the disadvantages of lower payload and less agility when compared to the Rafale. We’ll suck up “good enough” 4th gen fighter handling (or better depending on which reports you read) for the avionics, situational awareness aids, and stealth features. Stealth provides an extra option for the Lightning II; if we choose not to use it on a given mission we get a F-16/F/A-18 with stupidly good avionics and integrated ECM. That’s a fine package. Also, being American, the F-35 is dominant in the 4th dimension of aircraft design (i.e. the political one) as well.

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Now we get to the good planes. The planes that made the cut. The planes that have the right stuff. So which will win?

First to go is the Eurofighter. This is another case of reality making an otherwise excellent fighter not work out well in practice. It should be a great choice, being optimized for air-to-air engagements first, and having what is by all accounts an excellent cockpit. In simulated dogfights, it’s even beat the Raptor a few times–and when it did the planes weren’t fitted with IRST or helmet-mounted sights. And that hints at one of the problems. Stinginess on the part of the builders because of a hippie ‘peace dividend’ has not only reduced the procurement numbers, driving up the costs, but they’ve also looked to delete things no sane person would remove. The Germans bought fighters without the suite of jammers and warning systems. The British considered deleting the gun. And everyone is dragging their feet on the latest sensors. IRST and AESA radar integration are proceeding slowly. Who knows if or when the fancy AESA radar will actually fly on production fighters–which means Borgundy might have to shoulder the cost of integration of something that really ought to come standard on a modern fighter. Plus, the fact that there are three countries as primary contractors instead of one means that you get to deal with politics and all three. Hello delays, cost overruns and a sticker price that is embarrassingly high. The Rafale is slightly less dogfight optimized than the Eurofighter, but it has one prime contracting nation that is actually upgrading, and it’s a whole lot cheaper. The Rafale also carries more. Both the Super Hornet and the Gripen are significantly cheaper as well. So, the Eurofighter gets the axe.

Next down is the cheap and cheerful Gripen. I’ll go light on the summary, because Fishbreath has written on it extensively. Suffice to say it’s cheap to buy and cheap to maintain. I could make this elimination much easier by looking at the Gripen-C that’s actually flying as opposed to the Gripen-E that has been offered/promised Brazil, but that’s hardly fair. Also, Fishbreath would whine. So, why not the Gripen-E? Well, again, where’s the radar? It’s promised an AESA unit, but very little is known. I can tell you it won’t be a very powerful unit, because power requires transmit/receive modules and the Gripen has a tiny nose. Will it be good enough? Will it have the features that we’ve come to expect on such excellent units as the APG-80? We don’t know. We could probably take a chance on the radar, but the Gripen’s small size means it’s rather payload and range limited. It’s certainly not going to be very capable of a deep interdiction tasking. In terms of dogfighting, its small size is a benefit, but it doesn’t help it as a bomb truck and we need to do both. Borgundy is also concerned about the EW systems, or rather, the lack of a strong integrated EW suite. We’d probably have to pay for more of that, especially as SEAD capability is notably absent from the Gripen-E. Honestly, the Gripen’s low cost and ease of maintenance led it to fare much better than I thought it would, but at the end of the day, we want fancier electrics and more hauling capacity.

That leaves the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, which I will refer to as ‘Rhino’ like US Navy pilots and aircraft handlers, and Dassault’s Rafale. The Rhino has a significant price advantage, but otherwise they’re very similar fighters. Both have plenty of carrying capacity and hardpoints, with the edge going to Rafale for overall capacity. The Rhino has had an AESA radar for longer, and it’s currently widely in service. Rafale is just now getting those pushed out to the Armee de l’Air’s fleet. The Rhino’s radar is a bit better according to the published statistics, but the Rafale has an IRST unit. Both have a serious avionics suite built around making information easily available. Due to the IRST and the superior EW-suite, the Rafale does more with sensor fusion in it’s cockpit. On the EW front though, the Rhino beats all comers with its specialized EW-variant called the Growler, which is a phenomenal addition to the support fleet of any air force.

Handlingwise is where the Rafale edges out the Rhino though. The big Rhino could really use more engine power than it’s got, and in embiggening the Hornet, the spry handling has suffered. The Rafale has a more recent aerodynamic design and better power for its weight. The Rafale can still get decent range with conformal fuel tanks and no fewer than five hardpoints plumbed for droptanks. And, with nine other hardpoints, the Rafale is still capable of hauling a heavy warload. It’s got the interdiction capabilities, the dogfighting capabilities, and the sensor capabilities that we need. So it’s our choice for modern multir—hold on.

I appear to have forgotten one. Bugger. That won’t do at all.
It appears our conclusion was a trifle premature. Join us next time when the Rafale has a fly-off against the F-35A Lightning II.

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